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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming a decision of 
the Weber County Division of the Second Judicial District Court 
that is in direct conflict with a November 1971 decision of JUDGE 
THORNLEY K. SWAN in the Davis County Division of the Second 
Judicial District Court on the issue of collectable automobiles? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming a trial 
court»s summary disposition of important questions of municipal 
law which will have wide spread general impact in Utah? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err by failing to recognize the 
improper motives of Defendant/Respondents in making 
Plaintiff/Petitioners the only persons against whom a 38-year old 
lapsed ordinance had ever been enforced? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err by not holding both the 
trial judge and trial counsel to an equally high standard of 
judicial conduct and professional representation as established 
by recent decisions of this Court and by the language of Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered in 
Case No. 900160-CA. The opinion was not published. A copy 
thereof is included as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
1. Date of Entry: The decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals was entered on May 2, 1990. 
2. Order re Extension of Time: An ex party motion for 
extension of time to file a Petition of Certiorari was filed on 
May 29, 1990, and an order granting a 30-day extension from the 
date of entry of the Utah Court of Appeals decision was entered 
on May 29, 1990. 
3. Jurisdiction: Rule 46(b), Rule 46(c), and Rule 46(d) 
U.R.A.P. provide statutory authority for this Court to review the 
decision in question. 
RELEVANT LAW 
1. Rule 56, (b) (d) (e) (f) U.R.C.P.: 
(b) A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment sought, may at 
any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
Affidavits under subpart (e) or (f) of Rule 56 U.R.C.P. 
not required: 
When read in the light of subdivision (d), it is clear that 
subdivision (e) requirement that a party opposing the summary 
judgment motion file affidavits in support of the motion applies 
only when the opposing party has elected to and has filed 
affidavits in support of his motion. If the moving party chooses 
not to or simply fails to file affidavits, subdivision (e) is 
inapplicable. (Gadd v. Olson, 685 P2d 1041 (Utah 1984). (See 
Appendix F.) 
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(c) Trial court's duty relative to facts as found by 
deposition. (Text is set forth in its entirety in Appendix C.) 
(d) Trial court's duty to interrogate counsel to 
ascertain material facts. (Text is set forth in its entirety in 
Appendix C.) 
(e) Counsel on appeal is unable to determine from the 
exhibits furnished by opposing counsel to the Court of Appeals 
whether or not Defendant/Respondent's July 3, 1989, Memorandum 
was supported by affidavits and, therefore, assumes that subpart 
(e) does not apply. 
(f) Trial court's duty to order a continuance to 
permit copy of Defendant City's Zoning Inspector's deposition to 
be produces. (Text is set forth in its entirety in Appendix C.) 
1952 Centerville City ordinance pertinent language, 
Centerville City ordinance 1968, Centerville City ordinance March 
17, 1970, December 17, 1985, pertinent sections. Centerville 
City nuisance ordinance enacted April 1, 1970. (Appendix D.) 
Utah State Statutes, 41-1-195 thru 41-1-198 UCA 1953 as 
amended April 23, 1990, Collector Motor Vehicles defined, 
optional titles; 41-1-79.5 Abandoned and inoperable vehicles, 
Determined by Commission. (Appendix E.) 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Hearings of July 27, 1988, November 8, 1989, and December 
13, 1989, when second order for summary judgment was rendered. 
(Appendix B.) 
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Applicable Utah State Statutes cited. (Appendix E.) 
Case law cited. (Appendix F.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action in the Trial Court is the attempt of a husband 
and wife who are joint tenants of real property fronting on Utah 
State Road 106 without pedestrian sidewalk to stop the six-year-
old prosecution of Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, and reverse the 
criminal conviction in the Bountiful Division of the Second 
Circuit Court of Petitioner, VERLE ROBERTS, which was not timely 
appealed by former counsel. Petitioners sought to establish a 
nonconforming use. At all times relevant to this action, 
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, has had sole title to SIX (6) or more 
automobiles properly titled under Utah State statutes. 
VERLE ROBERTS is the Co-Petitioner/Appellant with her 
husband, J. VAL ROBERTS. At no time has VERLE ROBERTS ever owned 
any interest in any of the automobiles that are the subject of 
this action. 
VERLE ROBERTS has never had anything more than a joint 
tenant interest in the real property owned by Petitioners at 499 
North Main, Centerville, Davis County, Utah. 
Petitioner/Appellants claim a prior existing, nonconforming 
use to the municipal ordinance making the keeping of inoperable 
automobiles on private A-l property within the City for periods 
varying from SEVEN (7) to THIRTY (30) days maximum a nuisance 
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor. 
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Section 41-1-195(4) UCA 1953, Laws of Utah 1990, ch. 292, 
effective April 23, 1990, (Appendix E) was not argued in the 
Lower Court in December of 1989 when the decision appealed from 
was rendered nor was it presented to the Utah Court of Appeals 
because Petitioners had no knowledge of its enactment. This 
statute makes lawful the accumulation of a class of motor 
vehicles known as "collector motor vehicles which applies to any 
vehicle 20 years or older that is not used on the highway and has 
been acquired primarily as a collector's item." (Full text 
Appendix E.) 
The new statute does away with the requirements of the City 
ordinances complained of herein for all automobiles acquired 
primarily as collector's items and voids the decision of the 
Lower Court and of the Court of Appeals as well as all similar 
ordinances among the 228 incorporated cities and towns of the 
State of Utah. 
Petitioner/Appellants being the only persons in the City of 
Centerville to have ever been prosecuted in 38 years under any of 
the City ordinances cited, had discussed with their counsel in 
the Lower Court the doctrine of dissuaitude, and believe that he 
was prepared to argue Petitioners1 United States Constitutional 
rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be protected from prosecution for violation of an 
ordinance that had lapsed for want of enforcement over nearly 
FOUR decades. The trial court judge precipitously invoked a 
doctrine from a foreign jurisdiction in a 1972 Colorado case 
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which he ruled, without making specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, gave the Court authority to decide the matter 
by summary judgment. Neither Petitioner in the case at bar was 
advised by their counsel to attend the December 13, 1989, 
hearing. The affidavits of JAMES G. PARRISH, DAVID F. PARRISH, 
and LARRY G. SMITH were present in the record raising issues of 
fact that were disputed. (Appendix B, TR page 13, line 21.) 
(For full text, see Appendix I.) In addition, the deposition of 
Centerville City Zoning Enforcement Officer, RANDY RANDALL, taken 
by Appellants' trial counsel established as undisputed the 
nonenforcement of any of the Centerville City ordinances relating 
to the storage of motor vehicles on private property within the 
City against any other persons similarly situated at any time 
pertinent to the issues raised before the Lower Court, before the 
Utah Court of Appeals, and before this Honorable Court. Counsel 
for Defendant/Respondents1 claim that Petitioner's trial counsel 
had not taken the deposition of Centerville City's Zoning 
Enforcement Officer, RANDY RANDALL, described the posture of the 
case on July 27, 1988, but was not an accurate statement of the 
case when summary judgment was entered on December 13, 1989. 
There were clearly issues of fact which were material and which 
should have precluded disposition of the case by summary 
judgment. 
In the handling of this case on appeal, Petitioner, J. VAL 
ROBERTS, states that in accordance with the Anders Doctrine of 
the United States Supreme Court that he believes that the 
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Petition for Certiorari raises important constitutional questions 
under both the Utah and the United States Constitutions which he 
is not competent to handle for himself or in behalf of his wife 
as her attorney on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No evidentiary hearing was held in this matter. Both of the 
Petitioner/Appellants in this case have been subjected to 
numerous criminal prosecutions in connection with Petitioner, J. 
VAL ROBERTS'S, private collection of collector automobiles. The 
most recent criminal complaints were authorized by JERALD JENSEN, 
Justice of the Peace for Centerville City and a member of the 
City Council which, prior to his being appointed Justice of the 
Peace, solicited the criminal prosecution of both Petitioners 
herein by appointing a special prosecutor pro tern, in the person 
of THEODORE E. KANELL, Attorney at Law. 
VERLE ROBERTS was convicted of a criminal misdemeanor in 
Centerville Justice of the Peace Court by special Judge Pro Tern. 
DAVID YOUNG PAYNE, ESQ., who refused to dismiss the case against 
her notwithstanding the undisputed facts that she owned none of 
the automobiles, had no interest in any of their titles, and that 
her only interest in the real property where the automobiles are 
stored is that of a joint tenant. Even when special prosecutor, 
TED KANELL, and Petitioner's trial counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
ESQ., signed a written stipulation agreeing to the dismissal, 
Justice of the Peace, DAVID YOUNG PAYNE, refused to dismiss the 
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case and on his instructions, Petitioner was found guilty of a 
criminal misdemeanor. When the District Court refused trial 
counsel's application for an injunction to stop the prosecution 
until the issues raised by the pending civil challenge to the 
ordinances could be decided on appeal to the Second Circuit 
Court, Bountiful Department, Petitioner was again convicted of a 
criminal misdemeanor even though she had no interest in the 
automobiles, had only a joint tenancy interest in the real 
property where the automobiles are stored, and had no means short 
of a divorce to compel Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, to remove any 
of the automobiles which are the subject of the several actions 
in the Lower Court and of the appeal herein. 
All criminal action against Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, for 
violation of any of the Centerville City ordinances complained of 
herein were either reversed on appeal to the Second Circuit 
Court, Bountiful Department, or have been dismissed with 
prejudice at the suggestion of Centerville City's special 
prosecutor, TED KANELL, and the concurrence of trial counsel, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD. 
The City of Centerville and the Utah State Department of 
transportation have been seeking to coerce Petitioners into a 
donation of approximately 600 square feet of Petitioners' 
property fronting on Utah State Road 106 for a sidewalk easement 
since 1975. (Appendix G.) Centerville City renewed the attempt 
to claim a right-of-way easement at what City Administrator, 
DAVID HALES, apparently believed was the conclusion of the case 
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at bar by summary disposition in the Lower Court on January 3, 
1990. (Appendix H.) 
The Trial Court initially entered summary judgment without 
notice to ATTORNEY BRIAN M. BARNARD and subsequently withdrew its 
first judgment and conducted a hearing on December 13, 1989. So 
far as Petitioners can determine, the Lower Court entered no 
findings of fact in support of its decision. The Utah Court of 
Appeals sanctioned the Lower Court's methods of decision. (See 
second full paragraph, page 5, Utah Court of Appeals Decision, 
Appendix A.) 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
Absent elaboration by the Utah Supreme Court on the 
considerations that will invoke one or more of the subparts of 
Rule 46 U.R.A.P., Petitioners suggest relevant United States 
Supreme Court doctrine. In Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506, 
515 (1897) (emphasis added), the Court said, 
"It is a power which will be sparingly 
exercised,***the necessity of avoiding conflict 
between two or more courts of appeal or between 
courts of appeal and courts of a 
state,***11 
The text, Federal Practice and Procedure, at Sec. 16(c) by 
Professors Wright A. Miller, E. Cooper, and E. Gressman, Sec. 
4004 at 507-08 states, 
"As the number of cases seeking review has grown, 
the docket has had to be devoted***to statutory 
questions that are likely to have wide spread 
general impact." 
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First Question Presented; Did the Court of Appeals err in 
affirming a decision of the Weber County Division of the Second 
Judicial District Court that is in direct conflict with a 
November 1971 decision of JUDGE THORNLEY K. SWAN in the Davis 
County Division of the Second Judicial District Court on the 
issue of collectable automobiles? 
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, has relied upon the Second 
District Court decision on the issue of storage of old 
automobiles which was rendered in Davis County in November of 
1971, and has assembled a private collection of Volkswagen 
automobiles, a 1941 flat head Ford pickup truck, and a 1954 flat 
head Ford one-ton truck which are, by State statute, horseless 
carriages, (See Appendix E.) 
Unfortunately, Court records in Davis County have been 
computerized only back to 1981. All of the older files are 
stored in boxes in the basement of the Courthouse, and the 
handwritten file indexes which were prepared before the files 
went into storage are no longer helpful in locating the cases 
decided before 1981. 
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, located a collateral reference 
to the 1971 Davis County case and forwarded a request to trial 
counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD, that he contact the attorney who 
successfully defended MELVIN HELD, SR., against Farmington City 
on the issue of his right to store nonoperable automobiles at 
the Davis County seat in Farmington, Utah. (See Appendix F.) 
The question must be asked as to who was more at fault on 
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December 13, 1989f trial counsel who did not indicate the 
potential conflict between two divisions of the same district 
court or the trial judge who failed to interrogate counsel as to 
genuinely disputed issues and to delay the hearing so that 
depositions could be taken of MELVIN HELD, SR.'S widow and of 
Attorney, BILL THOMAS PETERS, under U.R.C.P. 56(c) (See 
Appendix C.) 
Second Question Presented; Did the Court of Appeals err in 
summarily affirming the trial court's summary disposition on an 
important question of municipal law which will have wide spread 
general impact? 
There are 228 incorporated cities or towns in Utah who are 
members of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. The League has 
drafted ordinances for many of its members about half of which 
are estimated to have ordinances dealing with nonoperational 
automobiles though the League maintains no specific records on 
the total number. It is clear that if such ordinances are 
selectively enforced, as in the case at bar, the questions 
presented are of wide spread impact. Serious constitutional 
questions of U.S. Constitutional stature under the Fifth 
Amendment, taking of an important real property right without 
compensation and denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, are presented. The Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted and amicus briefs invited from as 
many of the 228 incorporated cities as may be affected. 
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A decision by the Utah Supreme Court on the facts of the 
case at bar will prevent future selective enforcement of the 
existing ordinances as has occurred in both the Justice of the 
Peace, the District Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
conflict between the definition of a nonoperational vehicle as 
contained in the Centerville municipal ordinance drafted for the 
City by the Utah League of Cities and Towns in December of 1985 
which defines a motor vehicle as nonoperational unless it is 
currently inspected, registered, and licensed for road use, and 
Section 41-1-79.5 UCA as amended 1965 which states that a motor 
vehicle is only inoperable if, after inspection by an agent of 
the State Tax Commission, it is determined that, '"the vehicle in 
question cannot be rebuilt or reconstructed in such a manner as 
to allow its use on the highways of the State as a self-
propelled vehicle" will be resolved. (See Appendix D, 
Centerville City Ordinances. See Appendix E, Utah State 
Statutes.) 
The Writ should be granted to deal with the impact of the 
newly created class of "Collector motor vehicles11 under 41-1-
195, 41-1-196(3) UCA 1953 as amended April 23. 1990. which 
permits citizens of the State to collect, and by implication, 
therefore, to store and to maintain on their private property 
within the municipality where they reside, any number of motor 
vehicles over 20 years of age which are not used on the highway 
and have been acquired primarily as collector's items. (See 
12 
Appendix E for full text effective April 23, 1990.) (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Utah League of Cities and Towns estimates that of its 
228 members, half, or approximately 114 cities and towns, have 
ordinances substantially similar to those of the 
Defendant/Respondents which are complained of in this case. 
With half or more of the cities and town affected by the issues 
presented in this Petition, it is clear that the Utah Court of 
Appeals has decided a case which should be decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court because of its wide spread impact. 
J. VAL ROBERTS alleges under oath in the Verified Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari that the newly created class of 
"collector motor vehicles" includes all 28 of the Volkswagen 
automobiles which the City has sought to force Petitioner to 
remove by the Lower Court's Permanent Injunction Order through 
the application of its overly broad, punitive, and 
unconstitutional ordinances. The new State Statute renders all 
conflicting city ordinances, whether of the Defendant/ 
Respondents or of similarly situated municipalities anywhere in 
the State of Utah, void from and after April 23, 1990, and makes 
a nullity of language in such ordinances which requires 
mechanical inspections, emissions inspections, current licenses, 
current registration, and general highway worthiness 
preconditions to a citizen's right to store such vehicles on any 
property privately owned with any city in the State of Utah 
provided the vehicles meet the definition of being more that 20 
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years old and having been acquired as collector's items and are 
not used on the highway. 
The two 1976 Toyota sedans stored on the ROBERTS' property 
are neither wrecked, abandoned, nor inoperable as the same is 
defined by UCA 41-1-79.5 thus rendering the decision of the 
Lower Court and the sustaining decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals nullities if Petitioners are afforded the protection of 
41-1-195 thru 198 UCA 1953 as amended April 23, 1990. 
Third Question Presented: Did the Court of Appeals err by 
failing to recognize the improper motives of 
Defendant/Respondents in making Plaintiff/Petitioners the only 
person against whom a 38-year old lapsed ordinance had ever been 
enforced? 
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, having some training in the 
law, has pondered what motive or motives, what anger or what 
frustration, what public policy or what public need could be so 
strong as to cause Centerville City to initiate criminal 
prosecution against a citizen of 3 0 years standing beginning as 
far back as 1984 in the Justice Court of JAMES G. PARRISH, with 
prosecution by Attorney KEITH L. STAHLE? What motive or emotion 
would later cause the City to appoint a special prosecutor pro 
tern, and a special justice of the peace pro tern, to bring a new 
complaint authorized by the new Justice of the Peace, JERALD 
JENSEN, who went form being a City Council member to appointed 
Justice of the Peace and who sat on the same City council which 
initially solicited the prosecution of J. VAL ROBERTS for 
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storage of inoperable automobiles on the private property which 
he shares as a joint tenant with Petitioner, VERLE ROBERTS? 
What motive could be so strong as to impel the City officials 
and a former City Council member, now Justice of the Peace, to 
broaden the scope of prosecution to include Petitioner, J. VAL 
ROBERTS'S, wife? To insist on sending uniformed officers to 
serve the misdemeanor complaints and their several amendments at 
the Petitioners's residence where the teenage children were 
drawn into the controversy even after Petitioners were duly 
represented by Attorney BRIAN M. BARNARD and 
Defendant/Respondents and their agents had full knowledge of 
such representation? 
The material contained in Appendix G showing an effort to 
coerce Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, into donating 600 square feet 
of real property for a sidewalk easement fronting the Utah State 
Rod 106 together with a letter written by Petitioner, J. VAL 
ROBERTS, to the Utah State Department of Transportation citing 
the dangerous nature of the right-of-way design in front of 
Petitioner's home in Centerville as well as the potential for 
liability and suggesting that sufficient right-of-way be 
purchased by either the City of the State to elevate the problem 
is the most plausible explanation of the actions for the 
Defendant/Respondents. The plausibility of this explanation is 
vouched for by the fact that abutting property owners on the 
north and the south of Petitioner's real property have been 
persuaded by the Defendant/Respondents to sign quit-claim deeds 
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for the desired easements in exchange for the sidewalk 
improvements being paid for by the City and the State from 
highway safety grants. The documents contained in Appendix G 
show a renewal of the Defendant/Respondents' attempt to obtain 
the desired easement without paying the required compensation. 
It is respectfully suggested that actions speak louder than 
words and are a clearer indication of motives than anything that 
individuals are willing to articulate. 
Fourth Question Presented: Did the Court of Appeals err by 
not holding both the trial judge and trial counsel to an equally 
high standard of judicial conduct and professional 
representation as established by recent decisions of this Court 
and by the language of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
In dealing with motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the statutory language 
makes no distinction between the standard of professional 
conduct to which trial counsel is held in raising issues of fact 
which make summary judgment inappropriate and the standard of 
judicial conduct to which a trial judge is held in his 
interrogation of counsel, his inquiry into what material facts 
are in good faith controverted. It is incumbent upon the trial 
court judge to make an order specifying which facts appear 
without substantial controversy and directing such further 
proceedings as are just including depositions of additional 
witness and publication of existing depositions such as that of 
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Centerville City's Zoning Inspector RANDY RANDALL. If the trial 
court judge had discharged his duty under Rule 56(d) (Appendix 
C), he would have discovered from Defendant's counsel, JODY 
BURNETT, that Centerville City had never enforced any of its 
ordinances involving the storage of used automobiles whether 
partially dismantled, rusted, or otherwise against anyone other 
the Petitioners in the case at bar. The trial court judge would 
have discovered that the only other person whom the City of 
Centerville could say had cooperated with them, had sold the 
property to the City for a fire station or had merely relocated 
unused automobiles from the public street to his own private 
property. The trial court would have discovered, upon proper 
interrogation of counsel, that Petitioners' property had always 
been zoned A-l, not A-2, and had not been used solely as 
residential property but had been the regular abode of numerous 
cattle, pigs, and chickens. (See Appendix B, TR page 13, line 
21.) 
It is hornbook law that defaults and summary judgments are 
generally frowned upon by the entire judicial system, and the 
case at bar clearly illustrates the frailties of summary 
disposition of contested matters such as was done by the trial 
court and the Utah Court of Appeals in the case at bar. 
DEAN SAMUEL THURMAN, formerly Dean of the University of 
Utah College of Law, stated in a legal ethics class attended by 
Petitioner, J. VAL ROBERTS, in December of 1971, "If honest 
people believe that something is wrong with the law or that 
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there ought to be a law to solve a social problem, you may rely 
upon the fact that something is wrong with the law or that 
somewhere, in some jurisdiction, there is already a model 
statute that solves the problem." 
The State of Utah, by enacting the collector automobile 
statute of April 23, 1990, has come recently to a realization of 
an ongoing love affair between citizens and their automobiles 
even when the same are rusty or partially dismantled and are not 
suitable for use a transportation on the highways and byways of 
the State. The Writ of Certiorari should be granted in order to 
five full effect to the statute and to insure Petitioners their 
rights under the law. 
If all of the issues raised in the Petition are to be 
addressed, Petitioner request that the Court conduct oral 
argument in camera and invite amicus briefs from interested 
municipalities, the Volkswagen Club of America, Utah Chapter, 
the Classic Car Collector's Club; and if the Court finds that 
this Petition lacks the organization and polish necessary for 
the economical application of the Court's time to the issues, it 
has the authority and power to do as it did in Robert Dunn v. 
Gerald L. Cook, Warden, Utah State Prison, State of Utah, Case 
No. 880067, decided April 2, 1990, (Appendix F) and invite 
competent Appellate counsel to rebrief the issues thereby 
assuring Petitioners State and Federal Constitutional rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
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If the Court desired to have the case resolved without 
reaching the issued raised, it appears that counsel for the 
Petitioners, J. VAL ROBERTS, and counsel for the Respondent, 
JODY K. BURNETT, have a duty under the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to determine whether or not they can agree that 41-1-
195 thru 198 as amended April 23, 1990, has not, in fact, made 
it mandatory that the parties stipulate to an order vacating the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Trial court 
thereby rendering the issues moot. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the Court to grant a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Dated this 30th day of June, 1990. 
J/ VAIUP.OB 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before be on 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at X ^ Wg*^f &&*£ 
My commission expires: J*/?/ 
s 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI this 
2nd day of JuLbf. 1990, to the following: Jody K. Burnett, 
Daniel D. Hill, Attorneys for Defendant/Respondents, of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Post 
Office Bos 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
Attorney at Law 
20 
